my recent reads..

Jun 20, 2025 Movies WWII Aircraft

The Mosquito In Film

The de Havilland DH.98 Mosquito is one of the most famous (and beautiful) aircraft of the Second World War. Its use evolved to successfully fulfil many roles, including low- to medium-altitude daytime tactical bomber, high-altitude night bomber, pathfinder, day or night fighter, fighter-bomber, intruder, maritime strike, and photo-reconnaissance aircraft.

mosquito

There are of course many books covering the Mosquito, for example:

As such an iconic aircraft, it is no surprise that many films have also made it the hero of the story. Let’s take a look at a few..

633 Squadron (1964)

poster-633-squadron

An RAF squadron is assigned to knock out a German rocket fuel factory in Norway. The factory supplies fuel for the Nazi effort to launch rockets on England during D-Day.

The plot, which involves the exploits of a fictional World War II British fighter-bomber squadron, was based on the 1956 novel of the same name by former Royal Air Force officer Frederick E. Smith, which itself drew on several real RAF operations.

More:

It can be found on YouTube:

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Mosquito Squadron (1969)

poster-mosquito-squadron

In World War II, an RAF squadron leader mourns the death of a comrade and receives a bombing mission against a secret German V-2 rocket testing facility in France.

Although not a sequel, the film is similar to the 1964 film 633 Squadron and was influenced by it, even using some of its footage.

More:

It can be found on YouTube:

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The raid in Mosquito Squadron echoes Operation Jericho, a combined RAF–Maquis raid which freed French prisoners from Amiens prison in which the Mosquitos took part.

The pilots, navigators and planners of Operation Jericho tell their tales in their own words in this documentary, with copious contemporary footage:

clip

Skyggen i mit øje (2021)

poster-bombardment

Skyggen i mit øje is a Danish film also known as “The Shadow in My Eye”, or “The Bombardment” in English.

It is a powerful story based around Operation Carthage. On March 21st, 1945, the British Royal Air Force set out on a mission to bomb Gestapo’s headquarters in Copenhagen. The raid had fatal consequences when one of the planes crashed near Institut Jeanne d’Arc, causing the school to be misidentified as the target and also bombed. More than 120 people were killed, 86 of whom were children.

I saw The Bombardment on Netflix.

For Modellers

Airfix has a long history of kitting the Mosquito. In 1:72 scale, the new tooling from 2021 is now powering a wonderful line of variants, for example De Havilland Mosquito B.XVI (A04023). I’ve enjoyed building this one.

A04023-box

Airfix are perhaps most famous for their massive 1:24 kit, most recently released in a 2015 boxing from the original 2010 tooling: De Havilland Mosquito FB.VI (A25001A)

A25001A-box

Hasegawa have kitted a series of variants in 1:72 from a 1999 tooling, the latest being the 2016 release: Mosquito NF Mk.XIII ‘Night Fighter’ (02198).

02198-box

Tamiya also entered the 1:72 Mosquito market at the same time as Hasegawa and have produced a few variants from a 1999 tooling, the latest being the 2001 release: De Havilland Mosquito NF Mk.XIII/XVII

60765-box

Is there a good 1:48 scale mosquito? There hasn’t been a new tool for many years, but quite a few manufacturers:

A similar story for 1:32:

More exciting perhaps is the range of Mosquito kits produced by Mark I Models in 1:144 scale from a 2018 tooling. The latest being DH Mosquito FB. VI Amiens Prison Raid No. MKM144124

MKM144124-box

At the very extreme end of the scale, Pit-Road produce a wonderful 1:700 scale Mosquito in their WWII Royal Air Force Wings Set 1 No. S32, last released in 2022 from a 2013 tooling. I’ve actually used it to make a little resin-encased diorama:

MozzieBite_build

See also:


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Jun 18, 2025 Movies WWII Submarines

Close Quarters

Close Quarters (1943) is a docudrama that follows a Royal Navy submarine on a North Sea patrol during World War II. It uses vessels, equipment, and crew of the day, being filmed onboard the Royal Navy T-class Submarine N76 HMS Tribune.

HMS Tribune survived the war and was scrapped in 1947.

HMS_Tribune_2

The film also includes rare footage of a Royal Navy submarine depot ship in action..

depot-ship

See details on IMDB, find it at the Imperial War Museum, or watch it on YouTube:

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poster

For Modellers

SSMODEL released a new 1:350 3D-printed kit of the T-class Submarine (HMS Thrasher) in 2024. This joins an older Pit-Road plastic injection kit, also 1:350.

ssmodel-ssc350958s


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Mar 1, 2025 Politics

How can NATO de-risk from the US?

If there was any remaining doubt, the US is clearly no longer a reliable ally. When European and NATO priorities are not aligned with the US, as is now the case in Ukraine, the US is at best disinterested, and at worst an adversary.

It now appears European and NATO members are scrambling to “de-risk” their military from US entanglement. The alarm has been rung before, but not many seem to have taken the possibility seriously until now. See for example The Conversation from November 15, 2024: The return of Trump means Britain must rethink its defence strategy – and role in the world.

Although Trump just blew things up, this is not a new issue. Even under Biden, the fingerprints of uncomfortable US coercion have been clearly on the scales. Take the apologist stance and luke-warm responses from close US allies to Gaza, the constant need to lobby Washington to allow arms to be used in Ukraine, and how everything needs to come with a “China Chaser” (i.e. no matter the topic, it always seems necessary for western leaders to add a spin on what it means for containing China, apparently to ingratiate oneself to the US).

But what is the actual extent of NATO dependency on the US? I tried to do some research. This is what I’ve found.

NATO Funding: a US Protection Racket?

Up to 60% of NATO equipment spending goes to U.S. firms. No wonder Trump wants members to spend more!

Estimated Proportions:

  • Smaller members (Baltics, Eastern Europe): 30–60% of equipment spending goes to U.S. firms.
  • Larger members (Germany, France): 10–20% due to domestic industries.

Data Sources: U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) reports and SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. These are only estimates. Determining the exact allocation of NATO member countries’ defense budgets to U.S. and non-U.S. beneficiaries is challenging due to the lack of publicly available, detailed procurement data.

Detailed Breakdown and Assessment of NATO Spending (2003–2023)

Overview of NATO Defense Spending Guidelines

NATO members agreed in 2006 (reaffirmed in 2014) to spend 2% of GDP on defense, with 20% of that allocated to major equipment (including R&D). Numbers are now starting to change rapidly, for example UK recently announcing a rise to 2.5% of GDP by 2027.

Total NATO defense spending has risen significantly since 2014, driven by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In 2023, NATO’s total defense expenditure exceeded $1.3 trillion, with the U.S. accounting for ~70% of this.

Total NATO Defense Spending (2003–2023)

  • 2003: ~$600 billion
  • 2014: ~$850 billion (post-Crimea inflection point)
  • 2023: ~$1.3 trillion
  • Cumulative (20-year total): ~$18–20 trillion (adjusted for inflation).

Trend: Spending declined post-Cold War until 2014, then surged. The U.S. consistently accounts for 65–75% of total NATO spending.

Country-by-Country Breakdown (Key Members)

Country Avg. % GDP (2003–2023) 2023 Spending Total (20-Yr) Spending to US-Based Sources Spending Elsewhere
United States 3.5–4.5% $886B (2023) ~$15T n/a n/a
Germany 1.2–1.5% (to 1.6% in 2023) $76B ~$1T 10–15% (F-35s, P-8 Poseidon) 85–90% (EU defense contractors)
France 1.8–2.0% $53B ~$800B 5–10% (e.g., Reaper drones) 90–95% (domestic: Dassault, Naval Group)
UK 2.0–2.5% $68B ~$1.1T 15–20% (F-35s, CH-47 Chinooks) 80–85% (BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce)
Poland 1.8% (to 4.0% in 2023) $29B ~$150B 30–40% (HIMARS, Abrams tanks) 60–70% (local modernization)
Canada 1.0–1.3% $26B ~$300B 20–25% (F-18 upgrades) 75–80% (domestic/other allies)
Baltic States 1.5–2.5% (to 2.5–3.0% post-2022) $3–4B each ~$40B total 50–60% (Javelins, Strykers) 40–50% (Nordic/EU suppliers)

Spending on US-Based Sources

Key Purchases:

  • F-35 Jets: 14 European NATO members have ordered F-35s (e.g., Germany: $8B for 35 jets).
  • Patriot Missiles: Widely purchased (e.g., Poland: $4.8B for 2023).
  • HIMARS: Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland have multi-billion-dollar contracts.

Estimated Proportions:

  • Smaller members (Baltics, Eastern Europe): 30–60% of equipment spending goes to U.S. firms.
  • Larger members (Germany, France): 10–20% due to domestic industries.

Data Sources: U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) reports and SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.

Challenges in Tracking Spending Destinations

  • Procurement vs. Operational Costs: Only ~20–30% of defense budgets go to equipment (where cross-border spending occurs).
  • Lack of Transparency: Few countries publish vendor-specific data (e.g., France’s Leclerc tanks are domestic).
  • US Dominance: U.S. firms (Lockheed Martin, Raytheon) supply ~40% of global arms, influencing NATO spending flows

The Technical and Operational Lock-in

Let’s look at some of the key weapons systems purchased from the US, and the extent to which end-users have operational and strategic control of those systems.

F-35 Lightning II: Limited Autonomy

f-35a

Technical Dependencies:

  • Software Control: The F-35’s mission systems, including its Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) and its successor Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN), are entirely U.S.-controlled. Maintenance, diagnostics, and software updates require U.S. approval.
    • Countries cannot modify the aircraft’s software (e.g., integrating non-U.S. weapons) without U.S. consent.
    • Example: The U.S. blocked Turkey from receiving F-35s after it purchased Russian S-400 systems, citing incompatibility and security risks.
  • Stealth Technology: Critical coatings and radar-absorbent materials are classified and maintained by U.S. contractors. Repairs often require U.S. technicians.

Logistical Dependencies:

  • Supply Chain: Spare parts, engines (Pratt & Whitney F135), and sensors (e.g., Northrop Grumman AN/APG-81 radar) are sourced exclusively from U.S. suppliers.
    • Countries must rely on the Global Sustainment Network managed by Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon.
  • Depot Maintenance: Heavy maintenance (e.g., engine overhauls) occurs in the U.S., Italy, or Japan—all under U.S. oversight.

Strategic Implications:

  • Interoperability: F-35s are designed to share data seamlessly with NATO/U.S. networks, but this requires alignment with U.S. operational protocols.
  • Data Sovereignty: Sensor data (e.g., targeting info) is filtered through U.S.-controlled systems, raising concerns about third-party access (e.g., Israel negotiated custom data safeguards).

Patriot Missile Systems: Conditional Readiness

patriot

Technical Dependencies:

  • Fire Control Software: Patriot systems rely on U.S.-updated software for threat libraries (e.g., identifying Russian/Iranian missiles). Client states cannot independently reprogram these databases.
    • Example: Saudi Arabia’s Patriots failed to intercept Houthi missiles in 2019, partly due to software limitations in distinguishing threats.
  • Radar and Interceptors: The PAC-3 MSE interceptor and AN/MPQ-65 radar are proprietary. Upgrades (e.g., PAC-4) require U.S. approval.

Logistical Dependencies:

  • Missile Resupply: Patriot interceptors are produced in the U.S. (Raytheon/Lockheed), creating bottlenecks during prolonged conflicts (e.g., Ukraine’s requests for more Patriots in 2023).
  • Maintenance Contracts: Most maintenance is handled by U.S. contractors or through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs.

Operational Independence:

  • Tactical Control: Operators can engage targets autonomously, but system effectiveness depends on U.S. tech support during crises.
  • Political Leverage: The U.S. can delay parts/upgrades to influence allies’ actions (e.g., pressure on Gulf states to limit use against Iran).

HIMARS: Flexibility with Strings Attached

himars

Technical Dependencies:

  • Fire Control Systems: HIMARS’s GPS-guided rockets (e.g., GMLRS, ATACMS) rely on U.S. satellite networks. The U.S. could theoretically disable GPS precision for specific users.
    • Example: Ukraine’s HIMARS were reportedly geofenced by the U.S. to prevent strikes deep inside Russia (until restrictions eased in 2023).
  • Munitions: Client states cannot produce GMLRS rockets domestically. Resupply requires U.S. approval.

Logistical Dependencies:

  • Rocket Supply: The U.S. controls production rates and prioritizes buyers. Poland’s 2022 $10B HIMARS deal includes a clause for U.S. priority during global shortages.
  • Training: U.S. Army or contractor-led training is mandatory for certification.

Operational Independence:

  • Tactical Freedom: Operators can deploy HIMARS without real-time U.S. oversight, but reliance on U.S. munitions and GPS limits unilateral campaigns.
  • Export Controls: The U.S. restricts munitions sales under ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations). Taiwan’s HIMARS, for instance, are programmed to defend the island, not support offensive ops.

Overarching U.S. Leverage Mechanisms

  • ITAR Regulations: The U.S. legally mandates end-use monitoring, restricting modifications, resale, or deployment contrary to U.S. interests.
  • Foreign Military Sales (FMS): Purchases via FMS (85% of NATO’s U.S. buys) bind recipients to U.S. oversight, unlike direct commercial sales.
  • Interoperability vs. Autonomy: Systems like Link 16 (data link for NATO) enable joint operations but deepen reliance on U.S. networks.
  • Spare Parts Monopolies: Even if a country wants to “go rogue,” a lack of domestic repair infrastructure grounds systems within months.

Case Studies in Dependency

  • Turkey: Expelled from the F-35 program in 2019 over S-400 purchase; its existing F-35 infrastructure (maintenance hubs, pilot training) became obsolete overnight.
  • Germany: Delayed Patriot deployments to Poland in 2022 due to software complexities requiring U.S. input.
  • Ukraine: Initially restricted from using HIMARS against Russian soil—highlighting U.S. operational control even in non-NATO contexts.

Native European Alternatives

Alternatives to the F-35

  • A. Future Combat Air System (FCAS/SCAF)
    • Lead Nations: France, Germany, Spain.
    • Components:
      • Next-Gen Fighter (NGF): A 6th-generation stealth fighter with AI and networked capabilities (planned operational by 2040).
      • Remote Carriers: AI-driven drone swarms for support.
      • Combat Cloud: Secure data-sharing network.
    • Progress: Prototypes delayed due to Franco-German industrial disputes (e.g., Dassault vs. Airbus workshare).
  • B. Tempest (Global Combat Air Programme, GCAP)
    • Lead Nations: UK, Italy, Japan (Sweden joined as observer).
    • Features:
      • 6th-gen fighter with laser weapons, hypersonic capabilities, and optional piloting.
      • Digital Design: Open-architecture software for rapid upgrades.
    • Timeline: Aiming for service entry by 2035.
  • C. Existing European Fighters
    • Eurofighter Typhoon (Germany, Italy, Spain, UK): Upgraded with AESA radar (Radar 2) and compatibility with Meteor air-to-air missiles. Limited stealth but effective in air superiority roles.
    • Dassault Rafale (France): Competing with F-35 in exports (UAE, India, Greece); integrates SCALP cruise missiles and advanced EW systems.

Alternatives to Patriot Missiles

Alternatives to HIMARS

  • A. MARS II / MLRS-E
    • Lead Nation: Germany (with European upgrades).
    • Features:
      • Compatible with U.S. GMLRS rockets but can also fire European Precision Strike Missile (PSM) (under development).
      • Used by Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.
  • B. RCH 155
    • Developer: Germany (KNDS – KMW + Nexter).
    • Features:
      • Wheeled 155mm howitzer with HIMARS-like mobility and autonomous targeting.
      • Can fire Volcano precision-guided shells (70+ km range).
  • C. CAESAR 6x6/8x8
    • Lead Nation: France.
    • Role: Truck-mounted 155mm howitzer (longer range than HIMARS but artillery-focused). Exported to Czechia, Belgium, and Ukraine.
  • D. Polish WR-40 Langusta
    • Features: Indigenous rocket artillery system (122mm rockets), upgraded with Polish targeting systems.

Key European-Developed Munitions

  • Meteor Missile (Air-to-Air): Outranges U.S. AIM-120 AMRAAM; used by Eurofighter/Rafale.
  • SCALP/Storm Shadow (Cruise Missile): Deployed in Ukraine with 560 km range.
  • Brimstone (UK): Precision ground-attack missile used on Eurofighters.

Collaborative European Defense Initiatives

  • European Defence Fund (EDF): Funds joint R&D (e.g., hypersonic interceptors, drones).
  • PESCO Projects: 60+ EU defense initiatives, including:
  • Eurodrone: Remote-piloted aircraft for surveillance/strike.
  • European Hypersonic Defence Interceptor (HYDEF).
  • MBDA: European missile consortium developing Enforcer (precision missile) and Spear (air-to-surface).

Challenges for European Alternatives

  • Delays and Fragmentation: FCAS and Tempest risk duplication; political disagreements slow progress.
  • Export Competition: U.S. systems dominate due to economies of scale (e.g., F-35 costs 80M/unitvs.Rafale’s115M)
  • Tech Gaps: Europe lags in stealth, sensor fusion, and satellite networks (relies on U.S. GPS/EU Galileo).
  • U.S. Components: Even “European” systems often include U.S. parts (e.g., Eurofighter’s EJ200 engine uses U.S. alloys).

Europe has viable alternatives in development, but most lack the maturity, scale, or multi-role versatility of U.S. systems like the F-35. Short-term reliance on U.S. gear remains likely, but projects like FCAS, SAMP/T, and PESCO signal a long-term shift toward strategic autonomy. Success hinges on sustained funding, political cohesion, and faster innovation cycles.

For real-time deterrence (e.g., against Russia), Europe still leans on U.S. systems—but the roadmap for sovereignty is taking shape.

Implications for Other Regions

Too much to cover here, but the implications are global. For example:

  • ASEAN
    • dependency on U.S. military technology is moderate and selective, concentrated in treaty allies like the Philippines and Singapore. Most members deliberately diversify suppliers to avoid overreliance, blending U.S., European, Russian, and indigenous systems.
  • AUKUS
    • already criticised as a bad deal in Australia, AUKUS cannot function as envisioned without sustained U.S. commitment.
    • Should the UK or Australia wish to veer from US policy, for example, thinking it might be a bad idea to start a shooting war with China, then the US can pull the plug.
  • Five Eyes
    • the Anglosphere intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States
    • hard to imagine how this could continue to operate if the US is the frenemy in the room.

Sources


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Jan 26, 2025 Electronics

Little Electronic Art Projects 10th Anniversary

I started the LittleArduinoProjects GitHub repository back in 2014 when I started playing around with an Arduino and re-learning electronics. It currently goes by the name “LEAP: Little Electronic Art Projects”, with over 600 projects included in the project catalog hosted at https://leap.tardate.com/.

leap-2025

Over the years the repository accumulated over 2Gb of obsolete commits, and so much git history that it wasn’t even possible to do a git push of the entire repo without resorting to batch tricks.

Entering the 11th year of the repository, I decided to do a one-time squash of the project history and essentially restart the git history from scratch:

  • https://github.com/tardate/LittleArduinoProjects remains the primary repo
    • but with the git history squashed
      • retains the original first commit as the base, so any clones and forks will share a common root commit
    • I’ve taken the opportunity to rename the working branch from master to main
  • https://github.com/tardate/LittleArduinoProjects-archive-2014-2024 is a snapshot of the repository prior to the squash
    • marked as archived in GitHub, with issues etc disabled
    • retains the full git history in the very unlikely event that anyone needs to refer back to specific change

What this means in practice:

  • if you are just viewing LittleArduinoProjects on GitHub or the web, there is no impact
  • if you have a clone of the LittleArduinoProjects repository:
    • the simplest is just to throw it away and make a fresh clone of the repo
    • if you have work-in-progress changes on private branches, you will probably want to cherry-pick the changes to a branch based on the new main branch
      • if you need help with that, reach out or post an issue
  • old pull requests (PR) will be based on the old history. Reviving any old PRs will require the changes to be rebased on the new history.

Hopefully this will help make the LittleArduinoProjects repository fit for use for another 10 years or more..


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