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Mar 1, 2025 Politics

How can NATO de-risk from the US?

If there was any remaining doubt, the US is clearly no longer a reliable ally. When European and NATO priorities are not aligned with the US, as is now the case in Ukraine, the US is at best disinterested, and at worst an adversary.

It now appears European and NATO members are scrambling to “de-risk” their military from US entanglement. The alarm has been rung before, but not many seem to have taken the possibility seriously until now. See for example The Conversation from November 15, 2024: The return of Trump means Britain must rethink its defence strategy – and role in the world.

Although Trump just blew things up, this is not a new issue. Even under Biden, the fingerprints of uncomfortable US coercion have been clearly on the scales. Take the apologist stance and luke-warm responses from close US allies to Gaza, the constant need to lobby Washington to allow arms to be used in Ukraine, and how everything needs to come with a “China Chaser” (i.e. no matter the topic, it always seems necessary for western leaders to add a spin on what it means for containing China, apparently to ingratiate oneself to the US).

But what is the actual extent of NATO dependency on the US? I tried to do some research. This is what I’ve found.

NATO Funding: a US Protection Racket?

Up to 60% of NATO equipment spending goes to U.S. firms. No wonder Trump wants members to spend more!

Estimated Proportions:

  • Smaller members (Baltics, Eastern Europe): 30–60% of equipment spending goes to U.S. firms.
  • Larger members (Germany, France): 10–20% due to domestic industries.

Data Sources: U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) reports and SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. These are only estimates. Determining the exact allocation of NATO member countries’ defense budgets to U.S. and non-U.S. beneficiaries is challenging due to the lack of publicly available, detailed procurement data.

Detailed Breakdown and Assessment of NATO Spending (2003–2023)

Overview of NATO Defense Spending Guidelines

NATO members agreed in 2006 (reaffirmed in 2014) to spend 2% of GDP on defense, with 20% of that allocated to major equipment (including R&D). Numbers are now starting to change rapidly, for example UK recently announcing a rise to 2.5% of GDP by 2027.

Total NATO defense spending has risen significantly since 2014, driven by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In 2023, NATO’s total defense expenditure exceeded $1.3 trillion, with the U.S. accounting for ~70% of this.

Total NATO Defense Spending (2003–2023)

  • 2003: ~$600 billion
  • 2014: ~$850 billion (post-Crimea inflection point)
  • 2023: ~$1.3 trillion
  • Cumulative (20-year total): ~$18–20 trillion (adjusted for inflation).

Trend: Spending declined post-Cold War until 2014, then surged. The U.S. consistently accounts for 65–75% of total NATO spending.

Country-by-Country Breakdown (Key Members)

Country Avg. % GDP (2003–2023) 2023 Spending Total (20-Yr) Spending to US-Based Sources Spending Elsewhere
United States 3.5–4.5% $886B (2023) ~$15T n/a n/a
Germany 1.2–1.5% (to 1.6% in 2023) $76B ~$1T 10–15% (F-35s, P-8 Poseidon) 85–90% (EU defense contractors)
France 1.8–2.0% $53B ~$800B 5–10% (e.g., Reaper drones) 90–95% (domestic: Dassault, Naval Group)
UK 2.0–2.5% $68B ~$1.1T 15–20% (F-35s, CH-47 Chinooks) 80–85% (BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce)
Poland 1.8% (to 4.0% in 2023) $29B ~$150B 30–40% (HIMARS, Abrams tanks) 60–70% (local modernization)
Canada 1.0–1.3% $26B ~$300B 20–25% (F-18 upgrades) 75–80% (domestic/other allies)
Baltic States 1.5–2.5% (to 2.5–3.0% post-2022) $3–4B each ~$40B total 50–60% (Javelins, Strykers) 40–50% (Nordic/EU suppliers)

Spending on US-Based Sources

Key Purchases:

  • F-35 Jets: 14 European NATO members have ordered F-35s (e.g., Germany: $8B for 35 jets).
  • Patriot Missiles: Widely purchased (e.g., Poland: $4.8B for 2023).
  • HIMARS: Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland have multi-billion-dollar contracts.

Estimated Proportions:

  • Smaller members (Baltics, Eastern Europe): 30–60% of equipment spending goes to U.S. firms.
  • Larger members (Germany, France): 10–20% due to domestic industries.

Data Sources: U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) reports and SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.

Challenges in Tracking Spending Destinations

  • Procurement vs. Operational Costs: Only ~20–30% of defense budgets go to equipment (where cross-border spending occurs).
  • Lack of Transparency: Few countries publish vendor-specific data (e.g., France’s Leclerc tanks are domestic).
  • US Dominance: U.S. firms (Lockheed Martin, Raytheon) supply ~40% of global arms, influencing NATO spending flows

The Technical and Operational Lock-in

Let’s look at some of the key weapons systems purchased from the US, and the extent to which end-users have operational and strategic control of those systems.

F-35 Lightning II: Limited Autonomy

f-35a

Technical Dependencies:

  • Software Control: The F-35’s mission systems, including its Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) and its successor Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN), are entirely U.S.-controlled. Maintenance, diagnostics, and software updates require U.S. approval.
    • Countries cannot modify the aircraft’s software (e.g., integrating non-U.S. weapons) without U.S. consent.
    • Example: The U.S. blocked Turkey from receiving F-35s after it purchased Russian S-400 systems, citing incompatibility and security risks.
  • Stealth Technology: Critical coatings and radar-absorbent materials are classified and maintained by U.S. contractors. Repairs often require U.S. technicians.

Logistical Dependencies:

  • Supply Chain: Spare parts, engines (Pratt & Whitney F135), and sensors (e.g., Northrop Grumman AN/APG-81 radar) are sourced exclusively from U.S. suppliers.
    • Countries must rely on the Global Sustainment Network managed by Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon.
  • Depot Maintenance: Heavy maintenance (e.g., engine overhauls) occurs in the U.S., Italy, or Japan—all under U.S. oversight.

Strategic Implications:

  • Interoperability: F-35s are designed to share data seamlessly with NATO/U.S. networks, but this requires alignment with U.S. operational protocols.
  • Data Sovereignty: Sensor data (e.g., targeting info) is filtered through U.S.-controlled systems, raising concerns about third-party access (e.g., Israel negotiated custom data safeguards).

Patriot Missile Systems: Conditional Readiness

patriot

Technical Dependencies:

  • Fire Control Software: Patriot systems rely on U.S.-updated software for threat libraries (e.g., identifying Russian/Iranian missiles). Client states cannot independently reprogram these databases.
    • Example: Saudi Arabia’s Patriots failed to intercept Houthi missiles in 2019, partly due to software limitations in distinguishing threats.
  • Radar and Interceptors: The PAC-3 MSE interceptor and AN/MPQ-65 radar are proprietary. Upgrades (e.g., PAC-4) require U.S. approval.

Logistical Dependencies:

  • Missile Resupply: Patriot interceptors are produced in the U.S. (Raytheon/Lockheed), creating bottlenecks during prolonged conflicts (e.g., Ukraine’s requests for more Patriots in 2023).
  • Maintenance Contracts: Most maintenance is handled by U.S. contractors or through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs.

Operational Independence:

  • Tactical Control: Operators can engage targets autonomously, but system effectiveness depends on U.S. tech support during crises.
  • Political Leverage: The U.S. can delay parts/upgrades to influence allies’ actions (e.g., pressure on Gulf states to limit use against Iran).

HIMARS: Flexibility with Strings Attached

himars

Technical Dependencies:

  • Fire Control Systems: HIMARS’s GPS-guided rockets (e.g., GMLRS, ATACMS) rely on U.S. satellite networks. The U.S. could theoretically disable GPS precision for specific users.
    • Example: Ukraine’s HIMARS were reportedly geofenced by the U.S. to prevent strikes deep inside Russia (until restrictions eased in 2023).
  • Munitions: Client states cannot produce GMLRS rockets domestically. Resupply requires U.S. approval.

Logistical Dependencies:

  • Rocket Supply: The U.S. controls production rates and prioritizes buyers. Poland’s 2022 $10B HIMARS deal includes a clause for U.S. priority during global shortages.
  • Training: U.S. Army or contractor-led training is mandatory for certification.

Operational Independence:

  • Tactical Freedom: Operators can deploy HIMARS without real-time U.S. oversight, but reliance on U.S. munitions and GPS limits unilateral campaigns.
  • Export Controls: The U.S. restricts munitions sales under ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations). Taiwan’s HIMARS, for instance, are programmed to defend the island, not support offensive ops.

Overarching U.S. Leverage Mechanisms

  • ITAR Regulations: The U.S. legally mandates end-use monitoring, restricting modifications, resale, or deployment contrary to U.S. interests.
  • Foreign Military Sales (FMS): Purchases via FMS (85% of NATO’s U.S. buys) bind recipients to U.S. oversight, unlike direct commercial sales.
  • Interoperability vs. Autonomy: Systems like Link 16 (data link for NATO) enable joint operations but deepen reliance on U.S. networks.
  • Spare Parts Monopolies: Even if a country wants to “go rogue,” a lack of domestic repair infrastructure grounds systems within months.

Case Studies in Dependency

  • Turkey: Expelled from the F-35 program in 2019 over S-400 purchase; its existing F-35 infrastructure (maintenance hubs, pilot training) became obsolete overnight.
  • Germany: Delayed Patriot deployments to Poland in 2022 due to software complexities requiring U.S. input.
  • Ukraine: Initially restricted from using HIMARS against Russian soil—highlighting U.S. operational control even in non-NATO contexts.

Native European Alternatives

Alternatives to the F-35

  • A. Future Combat Air System (FCAS/SCAF)
    • Lead Nations: France, Germany, Spain.
    • Components:
      • Next-Gen Fighter (NGF): A 6th-generation stealth fighter with AI and networked capabilities (planned operational by 2040).
      • Remote Carriers: AI-driven drone swarms for support.
      • Combat Cloud: Secure data-sharing network.
    • Progress: Prototypes delayed due to Franco-German industrial disputes (e.g., Dassault vs. Airbus workshare).
  • B. Tempest (Global Combat Air Programme, GCAP)
    • Lead Nations: UK, Italy, Japan (Sweden joined as observer).
    • Features:
      • 6th-gen fighter with laser weapons, hypersonic capabilities, and optional piloting.
      • Digital Design: Open-architecture software for rapid upgrades.
    • Timeline: Aiming for service entry by 2035.
  • C. Existing European Fighters
    • Eurofighter Typhoon (Germany, Italy, Spain, UK): Upgraded with AESA radar (Radar 2) and compatibility with Meteor air-to-air missiles. Limited stealth but effective in air superiority roles.
    • Dassault Rafale (France): Competing with F-35 in exports (UAE, India, Greece); integrates SCALP cruise missiles and advanced EW systems.

Alternatives to Patriot Missiles

Alternatives to HIMARS

  • A. MARS II / MLRS-E
    • Lead Nation: Germany (with European upgrades).
    • Features:
      • Compatible with U.S. GMLRS rockets but can also fire European Precision Strike Missile (PSM) (under development).
      • Used by Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.
  • B. RCH 155
    • Developer: Germany (KNDS – KMW + Nexter).
    • Features:
      • Wheeled 155mm howitzer with HIMARS-like mobility and autonomous targeting.
      • Can fire Volcano precision-guided shells (70+ km range).
  • C. CAESAR 6x6/8x8
    • Lead Nation: France.
    • Role: Truck-mounted 155mm howitzer (longer range than HIMARS but artillery-focused). Exported to Czechia, Belgium, and Ukraine.
  • D. Polish WR-40 Langusta
    • Features: Indigenous rocket artillery system (122mm rockets), upgraded with Polish targeting systems.

Key European-Developed Munitions

  • Meteor Missile (Air-to-Air): Outranges U.S. AIM-120 AMRAAM; used by Eurofighter/Rafale.
  • SCALP/Storm Shadow (Cruise Missile): Deployed in Ukraine with 560 km range.
  • Brimstone (UK): Precision ground-attack missile used on Eurofighters.

Collaborative European Defense Initiatives

  • European Defence Fund (EDF): Funds joint R&D (e.g., hypersonic interceptors, drones).
  • PESCO Projects: 60+ EU defense initiatives, including:
  • Eurodrone: Remote-piloted aircraft for surveillance/strike.
  • European Hypersonic Defence Interceptor (HYDEF).
  • MBDA: European missile consortium developing Enforcer (precision missile) and Spear (air-to-surface).

Challenges for European Alternatives

  • Delays and Fragmentation: FCAS and Tempest risk duplication; political disagreements slow progress.
  • Export Competition: U.S. systems dominate due to economies of scale (e.g., F-35 costs 80M/unitvs.Rafale’s115M)
  • Tech Gaps: Europe lags in stealth, sensor fusion, and satellite networks (relies on U.S. GPS/EU Galileo).
  • U.S. Components: Even “European” systems often include U.S. parts (e.g., Eurofighter’s EJ200 engine uses U.S. alloys).

Europe has viable alternatives in development, but most lack the maturity, scale, or multi-role versatility of U.S. systems like the F-35. Short-term reliance on U.S. gear remains likely, but projects like FCAS, SAMP/T, and PESCO signal a long-term shift toward strategic autonomy. Success hinges on sustained funding, political cohesion, and faster innovation cycles.

For real-time deterrence (e.g., against Russia), Europe still leans on U.S. systems—but the roadmap for sovereignty is taking shape.

Implications for Other Regions

Too much to cover here, but the implications are global. For example:

  • ASEAN
    • dependency on U.S. military technology is moderate and selective, concentrated in treaty allies like the Philippines and Singapore. Most members deliberately diversify suppliers to avoid overreliance, blending U.S., European, Russian, and indigenous systems.
  • AUKUS
    • already criticised as a bad deal in Australia, AUKUS cannot function as envisioned without sustained U.S. commitment.
    • Should the UK or Australia wish to veer from US policy, for example, thinking it might be a bad idea to start a shooting war with China, then the US can pull the plug.
  • Five Eyes
    • the Anglosphere intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States
    • hard to imagine how this could continue to operate if the US is the frenemy in the room.

Sources


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Jan 26, 2025 Electronics

Little Electronic Art Projects 10th Anniversary

I started the LittleArduinoProjects GitHub repository back in 2014 when I started playing around with an Arduino and re-learning electronics. It currently goes by the name “LEAP: Little Electronic Art Projects”, with over 600 projects included in the project catalog hosted at https://leap.tardate.com/.

leap-2025

Over the years the repository accumulated over 2Gb of obsolete commits, and so much git history that it wasn’t even possible to do a git push of the entire repo without resorting to batch tricks.

Entering the 11th year of the repository, I decided to do a one-time squash of the project history and essentially restart the git history from scratch:

  • https://github.com/tardate/LittleArduinoProjects remains the primary repo
    • but with the git history squashed
      • retains the original first commit as the base, so any clones and forks will share a common root commit
    • I’ve taken the opportunity to rename the working branch from master to main
  • https://github.com/tardate/LittleArduinoProjects-archive-2014-2024 is a snapshot of the repository prior to the squash
    • marked as archived in GitHub, with issues etc disabled
    • retains the full git history in the very unlikely event that anyone needs to refer back to specific change

What this means in practice:

  • if you are just viewing LittleArduinoProjects on GitHub or the web, there is no impact
  • if you have a clone of the LittleArduinoProjects repository:
    • the simplest is just to throw it away and make a fresh clone of the repo
    • if you have work-in-progress changes on private branches, you will probably want to cherry-pick the changes to a branch based on the new main branch
      • if you need help with that, reach out or post an issue
  • old pull requests (PR) will be based on the old history. Reviving any old PRs will require the changes to be rebased on the new history.

Hopefully this will help make the LittleArduinoProjects repository fit for use for another 10 years or more..


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Dec 3, 2024 AI Deep thoughts

The AI Wasteland of 2030

In the glittering dawn of the AI revolution, businesses across the globe rush to integrate artificial intelligence into every conceivable process. From pricing algorithms to chatbots, automated recruiting to web content generation, the potential seems limitless. The hype is that by 2030, AI will have made business smarter, faster, leaner and someone (well, shareholders and billionaires at least) will be banking major coin as a result. Or perhaps not..

Perhaps in the real business world things will be a tad more prosaic. Perhaps, as we approach 2030, the landscape will have shifted dramatically. What was once a field of innovation and boundless promise is now littered with abandoned AI systems, barely functional algorithms, and a pervasive sense of disillusionment. Welcome to the “AI Wasteland!”

The Fall from Grace

Will the story of AI be a classic tale of over-promising and under-delivering? We already see the market saturated with AI solutions and consultants. Every company, from startups to conglomerates, is being lured into automating processes with AI or die. Sales forecasts, hiring decisions, customer service—all are being entrusted to machines. At first, it works well enough to justify the investment. But as time passes, the cracks began to show.

  • Knowledge Decay: Over time, the teams that built these systems move on, and the people left behind lack the expertise to maintain them. Documentation is sparse, AI systems are inherently opaque, and the once-shiny algorithms become black boxes no one dares to touch.
  • Complexity Explosion: the rush to automate imperfect business processes with AI reveal their flaws as solutions are scaled. Predictions became unreliable, biases crept in unchecked, and models failed to adapt to real-world changes. A game of AI whack-a-mole ensues, and before long the business finds itself running on a tangled web of AI point solutions, the complexity of which is beyond any single employee. AI systems have turned into liabilities rather than assets.
  • No Free Lunch (FO): As AI providers start being forced to price their services above cost, the ROI calculations start to look decidedly grim. Data storage, computing power, and constant retraining drains budgets. Meanwhile, the economic gains AI promised never materialize at scale.

Welcome to the AI Wasteland of 2030: Ghosts of AI Past

2030: the corporate world is haunted by the remnants of this AI gold rush. In offices everywhere, non-functioning chatbots offer glitchy apologies. Automated hiring systems churn out nonsensical candidate rankings. Predictive analytics tools remain plugged in, spewing irrelevant reports that no one reads.

The AI wasteland isn’t just physical; it’s cultural. Employees have grown weary of poorly implemented tools, customers are fed up with dehumanized interactions, and leaders have stopped believing in the transformative power of AI. The term “AI fatigue” has entered the corporate lexicon—a collective acknowledgment of the exhaustion stemming from chasing a dream that didn’t deliver.

So by 2030, disillusioned executives are wanting to pull the plug on AI. But for many, this is easier said than done. They no longer have the staff or institutional knowledge to “just rollback to pre-AI”. Stuck between a rock and a hard place, businesses fail.

Lessons Unlearned

As the industry surveys the wreckage, there’s little agreement on how to proceed. Some advocate for a return to basics, emphasizing human-led decision-making supported by simpler tools. Others believe AI can be salvaged, but only with stricter regulation, better education, and a cultural shift toward long-term thinking.

For now, though, the AI wasteland serves as a grim reminder of what happens when hype outpaces reality. Automation’s shine has worn off, and the stench of failure lingers. It’s a cautionary tale for those who dream too big without planning for the future—or understanding the past.

Future fact or fiction?


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Sep 27, 2024 Deep thoughts

Oppression

I can’t pinpoint exactly where it comes from, but somewhere along the way I’ve internalised a core value of “siding with the underdog”. Anti-Thatcherite Britain? Aussie tall-poppy syndrome? Catholic public school? Perhaps a mix of all these and more. I was recently introduced to the following quote from Periyar Erode Venkatappa Ramasamy that is I think a perfect formulation of the idea:

If a larger country oppresses a smaller country, I’ll stand with the smaller country.

If the smaller country has majoritarian religion that oppresses minority religions, I’ll stand with minority religions.

If the minority religion has caste and one caste oppresses another caste, I’ll stand with the caste being oppressed.

In the oppressed caste, if an employer oppresses his employee, I’ll stand with the employee.

If employee goes home and oppresses his wife, I’ll stand with that woman.

Overall, oppression is my enemy.

- Thanthai Periyar E. V. Ramasamy (17 Sep, 1879 – 24 Dec, 1973)

periyar_evr_stamp

Looking back now, I can see how this quote made the rounds on social media over the past few years, but I haven’t yet found a primary source to cite. This may be me running into a language barrier, as I presume his original words were probably in Tamil.

Nevertheless, it explains why my first instincts in all modern conflicts have been right .. IMHO!

And why I think that UN Security Council reform is essential to preserve and improve the prospect for all peoples to enjoy peace and security.

Until now, I thought that was a pipe dream, as who could imaging the US giving up its veto power? But now I see a rising chorus of people calling for reform

Kishore Mahbubani has argued in the Financial Times that “UN credibility depends on adjusting veto rights to match shift in global power” .. including quite provocatively suggesting the poetic justice if the UK were to cede its UNSC seat in favour of India.

And everyone seems to be calling for reform at the UN Security Council Open Debate on Leadership for Peace…

Please, no to the veto!


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